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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CECELIA WILSON and 
CLARA MARTIN, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 
9567 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries and property damage 
arising out of an accident when one of the plaintiffs was driving 
the other's automobile on 13th West Street in Salt Lake City, 
and the right rear wheel thereof crashed through a sewer 
manhole lid. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and judgment 
for each of the plaintiffs, defendant appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment 
in its favor as a matter of law and dismissal of the action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The pertinent facts leading to the filing and prosecution 
of the action are as follows: 
On August 20, 1961, the plaintiffs and respondents, 
Cecelia Wilson and her daughter, Clara Martin, were returning 
from a neighborhood grocery store in Mrs. Wilson's Ford 
automobile along Arapahoe Avenue in Salt Lake City. Clara 
Martin was driving and her mother, Mrs. Wilson, was sitting 
in the front seat along side of her (R. 63, lines 27, 28 and 29). 
When she reached 13th West, she turned north and ran over 
a sanitary sewer lid about 40 feet north of the intersection 
of Arapahoe Avenue and 13th West (R. 151, lines 12 and 13), 
at which time the rear wheel of the car fell into the manhole 
and Mrs. Martin and Mrs. Wilson suffered alleged personal 
injuries and damage to the Wilson car (R. 48 and 49). (See 
Exhibits P. 1, 2, 3 and 4.) There is some evidence that one 
of the braces on the lid had a latent crack, which was under-
neath side of the lid, (R. 143, lines 16 to 26), but that the 
main crack was freshly made (R. 51, lines 3 to 20 inclusive). 
The respondents produced two girls, approximately 14 years 
old, and a mature woman who testified that the lid had been 
broken for about one week or a little more, prior to the 
accident (R. 82, 85, 92, 93, 94 and 102, line 13). Salt Lake 
City has 11,000 sewer lids to inspect (R. 146, 147 and 149). 
Storm sewers are inspected twice per year; sanitary lids are 
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inspected approximately every month (R. 149). The sewer 
lid involved in this case is a sanitary sewer lid and was in-
spected on July 13, 1960, and found to be in a sound condition 
(R. 146, 151, lines 18 to 30). 
Salt Lake City had no actual knowledge or notice that the 
said sewer lid was cracked or broken, nor had it any notice 
that it was maintaining a hazardous condition on said street 
for vehicular travel (R. 148, 151, lines 18 to 30; and 152, lines 
1 to 19). The two questions raised by this appeal are whether 
or not under the plaintiffs' testimony Salt Lake City had con-
structive notice of the broken sewer lid and the hazardous 
condition it made for vehicular travel, to support a ii.nding that 
it was negligent and whether or not the defendant city is 
absolved from liability because it operates its sewer system 
in a governmental capacity. 
POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL 
I. THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT 
A FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT. 
II. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE 
PERSONAL INJURIES AND DAMAGE, BECAUSE IT 
OPERATES ITS SEWER SYSTEM IN A GOVERNMENTAL 
CAPACITY. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT 
A FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT. 
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The appellant contends that it was not negligent in main-
taining 13th West Street in a reasonably safe condition for 
vehicular traffic, and that the testimony of the plaintiffs' wit-
nesses that the lid had been broken for approximately one 
week is not sufficient lapse of time, considering the place 
of the accident and character of the defect, to warrant a finding 
that the appellant had constructive notice of such defect. 
In the case of City of Phoenix v. Clem, Supreme Court 
of Ariz., May 26, 1925, 28 Ariz. 315, 237 P. 168, holds at page 
17 3 of the Pacific Reporter: 
"The evidence clearly showing that the defendant 
had no knowledge of the hole in the trench, or that it 
had existed long enough to give the city constructive 
notice thereof, and these things under the facts of this 
case, being necessary before liability is established, 
the motion for an instructed verdict should have been 
granted.'' 
So with the case at bar, the appellant was not aware of 
any hazard to vehicular traffic on 13th West Street. The street 
is in the outskirts of the city and does not bear the burden 
of traffic as streets in the central area or arterial streets, and 
therefore the likelihood of the city officials obtaining notice 
of such defect would be much less than a defect on an arterial 
street or in the business district. See Exhibit P-4. 
In the case of Hedden et al v. Town of Bingham Canyon, 
Utah, 94 Utah 442, 78 P.2d 637, the Supreme Court held: 
"Evidence whether erection of a cement structure 
by municipality at side of highway was the cause of 
accumulation of ice and snow at the scene of an auto-
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mobile accident in which occupant of automobile lost 
her life was insufficient for the jury. 
"Evidence whether municipality was negligent in 
failing to provide a warning signal due to an alleged 
hazard presented on a street which curved at 30 o angle 
so as to render municipality liable for death of auto-
mobile occupant, sustained when automobile skidded 
on ice at the curve was insufficient for the jury." 
1\llaloney v. Salt Lake City, 1 Utah 2d 72, 262 P.2d 281, 
this court held: 
··In an action by pedestrian against city for personal 
injuries sustained when section of city sidewalk col-
lapsed, where there was no evidence that defect existed 
in sidewalk before the accident took place, which 
presented a hazard to those using it sufficient to give 
city notice that there was dangerously defective con-
dition which it negligently failed to correct, pedestrian 
could not recover." 
At page 282 of the Pacific Reporter, this court said: 
"In order to support this claim, the evidence must 
show that for some period of time before the accident, 
the sidewalk which collapsed was in such a condition 
that it obviously presented a hazard to those using it 
sufficient to give the city notice that there was a dan-
gerously defective condition which it negligently failed 
to correct. Only if the evidence will reasonably support 
a finding to that effect when construed most favorably 
to the appellant can we reverse the judgment of the 
trial court. In this respect we think appellant's evidence 
fails to support a finding in his favor." 
The decision was unanimous. The lower court had directed 
a verdict in favor of the respondent city and the plaintiff 
appealed. 
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In the case of Cheney v. City of Los Angeles, 119 C.A. 
2d 75, 258 P.2d 1099, at page 1100 ( 3) of the Pacific Reporter, 
the California court stated: 
"It is likewise settled that before a defendant muni-
cipality may be charged with constructive notice it 
(the defect) must have existed for a sufficient length 
of time and be sufficiently conspicuous or notorious 
to give rise to the inference that the defendant had 
knowledge thereof." 
In the case at bar the defect in the sewer lid had not 
existed long enough nor was it conspicuous enough to impute 
notice to the appellant city. 
In Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 191 P. 233, this 
court said: 
"Negligence consists in doing or omitting to do any 
act which an ordinarily prudent and careful person 
under the same circumstances would do or omit to do, 
but not in doing or omitting to do an act which can 
only be done or prevented by the exercise of extra-
ordinary exertion or care or by the expenditure of 
extra-ordinary sums of money." 
The accident involved in the case at bar happened in a 
sparsely populated area of the city and on a street with com-
paratively little travel. See Exhibit P4. 
In Scoville v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 60, 39 P. 481, page 
482, this court said: 
"The question of notice is not alone determined 
from the length of time a defect has existed, but also 
fron1 the nature and character of the defect, the extent 
of the travel, and whether it is in a populous or 
sparsely settled part of the city." 
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In Dahl v. Nelson and the City of Fargo, N. D. Supreme 
Court of N.D., January 26, 1953, 56 N.W. 2d 757, it was held 
that when an action against driver of automobile by guest 
was dismissed, but a judgment of $5,000.00 on jury's verdict 
was awarded plaintiff against the city of Fargo for maintaining 
an obstruction in the street, that the evidence which showed 
that ruts in a muddy street straddled a manhole encasement, 
and the auto in driving along said ruts collided with encase-
ment of the sewer manhole injuring guest, that maintenance 
in such condition for a period of 24 hours was insufficient 
to take to the jury the question of either actual or constructive 
notice of the defect. On page 760 ( 5) of the N.W. report 
the Supreme Court of North Dakota said: 
"In order for the city to have had sufficient notice in 
the instant case, it would have been necessary for the 
city to have had notice, first, that there was a single 
track down the center of the road which straddled the 
manhole; and, second that the ruts of the tracks 
were of sufficient depth so it should have reason-
ably been anticipated that they would eventually 
become deep enough to make the manhole casing an 
obstruction. Notice that the street was wet, had an 
unpaved surface and that some ruts might develop of 
course could be imputed to the city. From notice of 
these facts, however, it cannot be said that the city 
officials should have anticipated that the traffic upon 
the street would create a single track astride t he 
manhole, rather than one track for west bound traffic 
north of it and another for east bound traffic south 
of it, or that the ruts created by the traffic would 
become of dangerous depth. To say that the existence, 
for a period of one day, of the ruts astride the man-
hole, of sufficient depth to make witness Willits con-
sider them dangerous, is sufficient to impute to the 
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city notice of a defect, which was potentially but not 
certainly dangerous, would be to say that reasonable 
maintenance of the city's streets required those charged 
with the duty of street maintenance in the city of Fargo 
to make a careful inspection of all of the unpaved 
streets in all of the outlying districts of the city within 
twenty four hours after every rain, taking notice of 
the location of ruts, measuring or estimating their 
depth and reaching an accurate conclusion as to 
whether the ruts might eventually reach a depth which 
would become dangerous. In other words, it would 
burden a city with the duty of exercising not only the 
highest possible degree of care but a degree which 
in some instances would be impossible. Such is not the 
measure of a city's duty. A city is only required to 
exercise reasonable care to discover and remedy defects 
in its streets. 
"Since as a matter of law, the evidence in this case 
is insufficient to establish either actual or constructive 
notice of the defect in the street which caused the 
injuries suffered by the plaintiff's daughter and there 
appears to be no reasonable probability that the de-
ficiencies in the proof can be supplied upon a new 
trial, the judgment of the district court against the 
city of Fargo is reversed and the case ordered dis-
missed.'' 
The case of Colby v. City of Portland, et al., 85 Ore. 359, 
166 P. 537, was an action for personal injuries sustained by 
the plaintiff on a board walk crosswalk in one of the streets 
of Portland. It was testified to by a city employee that the 
defect complained of had existed from 3 to 6 weeks; others 
testified that the defect had existed open, patent and visible 
from 3 weeks to months. A rotten plank in the crosswalk gave 
way and plaintiff pushing a baby buggy in front of her, caught 
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her foot in defective plank and fell. She sued the city, mayor, 
councilmen and city engineer. Non-suit was granted the city 
and the individual defendants appealed. The Oregon Supreme 
Court held on page 543 of the Pacific report, paragraph 10: 
"Portland contains approximately a quarter of a 
million of inhabitants. It appears from the testimony 
that something less than a dozen people had noticed 
the defect, and that three or four of that number had 
casually mentioned it to neighbors, but nobody seemed 
to consider the matter serious enough to report to the 
authorities. The existence of the defect seems not to 
have been known to anybody, except these few persons 
living in the immediate neighborhood, and was not 
a matter of general public notoriety or concern. The 
plaintiff, who resided within a block of the crossing, 
testified that she was entirely ignorant of the defect, 
and yet it is contended the mayor and commissioners, 
with all the multitudinous duties devolving upon them, 
should be adjudged to have been negligent, and to pay 
the plaintiff $6,350.00, because they did not know of 
the existence of the defect in the walk for three weeks, 
or perhaps double that time, is no evidence of notice 
to the council, Of lack of diligence on their pa'f't in 
the discharge of their duties. If one of the principal 
bridges in the town should become in such a state of 
disrepair as to be a public menace or impede the 
public travel, it naturally would become a source of 
public concern to many people, and the commissioners 
would in the ordinary course of affairs hear of it. If 
they were charged with the duty of making a personal 
inspection of the walks of the city, and failed to find 
a defect which was open and apparent, there might 
be some reason for the inference that a defect which 
had existed for several weeks should have been dis-
covered and repaired; but in the very nature of things 
they can act only through subordinate officers, and 
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it is not claimed that any policeman or inspector ever 
made any report, and it is evident that no member of 
the council ever had any personal knowledge of the 
defect. There was no evidence to justify a finding that 
the mayor and commissioners were guilty of negli-
gence." 
In Smith v. Krebs et al., 166 Kan. 586, 203 P.2d 215, while 
the plaintiff was walking on a cement sidewalk in a city street 
she stepped on a board which covered an opening in the walk, 
the board gave way, she was injured and sued the city and the 
abutting lot owner for damages. Under the facts and the 
authorities stated in the opinion it is held that neither the 
city nor the owner of the abutting lot was liable: 
"Its (the city) only duty is to furnish streets and 
sidewalks that are reasonably safe and suitable for 
the use made of them by the public. Its liability for 
injuries to persons which result from defects of the 
streets or sidewalks arises by reason of the negligence 
of the city in failing to provide streets and sidewalks 
which are reasonably safe for use. It is a tort liability 
and the general rule is that the city is not negligent 
and has no liability for injuries to persons using the 
sidewalks resulting from a defect therein unless it has 
knowledge or notice of such defect and an opportunity 
to repair it. 
"In this case it is conceded that the city did not 
have knowledge of the defect, and there is no claim 
that it was patent. The board the plaintiff stepped on 
looked as sound as any of the others. There was nothing 
in the appearance of the covering over the hole in the 
sidewalk which would cause anyone looking at it to 
think it was otherwise than sound. 
10 
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''Therefore, under the authority of the cases above 
cited, it is clear that no negligence of the city was 
shown.'' (Page 217 id.) 
There was no patent defect in 13th West Street-plaintiffs 
themselves said the street looked fine. (R. 59, line 10; R. 64, 
lines 9 and 10; R. 70, lines 9 to 14). 
"There is in such instance no fixed or definite rule 
as to what length of time a defect must have existed to 
furnish notice. Much depends upon the character of 
the defect and upon the circumstances and surround-
ings.'' Williams v. Wessington Twp., 70 S.D. 75, 14 
N.W. 2d 493, at page 494. 
There was no evidence introduced m the case at bar 
to dispute the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses that the 
lid had been cracked for approximately one week, but they 
failed to notify the city or any of its servants or employees. 
There was no further evidence that the lid was originally 
defective, or of bad design or did not fit prior to its being 
broken. The slight discoloration on the underneath side of 
the lid may disclose some evidence of a fracture of longer 
duration than a week, but it was not discovered prior to the 
break because it was hidden from the inspector's view (R. 143, 
lines 14 to 25). 
"Injuries resulting from latent defects in a street 
not due to faulty municipal work, and which could 
not have been discovered by ordinary care and diligence, 
do not give right of action against the municipal 
corporation in the absence of such notice." C.J.S. Mu-
nicipal Corporations, Vol. 63, Section 829, page 169. 
11 
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II. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE 
PERSONAL INJURIES AND DAMAGE, BECAUSE IT 
OPERATES ITS SEWER SYSTEM IN A GOVERNMENTAL 
CAPACITY. 
In a recent case, this court held that cities operate their 
sewer systems in a governmental capacity, (Cobia vs. Roy City, 
Utah, rendered December 8, 1961), and in the particular 
case further held, that the defendant city of Roy was not liable 
for damage to the plaintiff's property, even though the de-
fendant may have been negligent. 
In the case at bar the manhole was maintained for flushing 
the sewer; it was a flush tank. (R. 149, lines 17 to 26). 
In operating a waterworks system for protection against 
fire, for flushing sewers or for other uses pertaining to public 
health and safety, a municipal corporation exercises govern-
mental power; C.J.S., Vol. 63, Municipal Corporations, Section 
241, page 51. (See R. 159, lines 10 to 25.) 
The lid alleged to be defective was a part of the sanitary 
sewer system of Salt Lake City and was used as a flush tank 
to wash out the sewer approximately once per m o n t h. 
The defendant operates its sewer system in a governmental 
capacity, and is not, therefore, liable for the alleged personal 
injuries and damages resulting from its operation. 
CONCLUSION 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the defendant's 
motion for non-suit and dismissal (R. 135) or directed verdict 
12 
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(R. 167) should have been granted and that in accordance 
with the law and the facts of this case and the authorities 
herein cited, the defendant is entitled to a judgment; that the 
plaintiffs take nothing by their complaint, and th~ case be 
remanded to the District Court for Salt Lake County, with 
instructions to enter its judgment for defendant and against 
the plaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
City Attorney 
13 
A. M. MARSDEN 
Assistant City Attorney 
414 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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